Air Force officials ousted over nuclear gaffes

The top military and civilian leaders of the U.S. Air Force were forced out Thursday over the handling of nuclear weapons, the Defense Department secretary said.

                                                                                   

Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley and Secretary Michael W. Wynne resigned over the department’s concern over two incidents, including the August flight of a B-52 bomber that flew across the country with nuclear weapons.

“Focus of the Air Force leadership has drifted” in terms of handling nuclear weapons and equipment, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said.

In August, a B-52 bomber flew from North Dakota to Louisiana with the crew unaware that six nuclear-tipped missiles were on board. Four officers were relieved of duty afterward, including three colonels.

                                                                                     Gates also cited this year’s discovery that components designed to arm and fuse nuclear warheads were accidentally shipped to Taiwan in

Critics also cite last month’s news that the Air Force’s 5th Bomb Wing failed a defense “nuclear surety” inspection — despite having months to prepare and being under close scrutiny after the previous incidents. The inspection found deficiencies in the wing’s ability to protect its part of the nation’s nuclear stockpile.

The resignations come after a report on a Navy admiral’s investigation that criticized the Air Force’s reactions to the incidents.

Gates said the report “depicts a pattern of poor performance” in which Air Force brass didn’t act to improve security after mishaps and Air Force personnel handling nuclear weapons consistently failed to follow existing rules.

Air Force leaders “not only fell short in terms of specific acts, they failed to recognize systemic problems, to address those problems or, when beyond their authority to act, to call the attention of superiors to those problems,” Gates said.

The investigation found that although the Taiwan incident didn’t compromise the integrity of the U.S. nuclear force, it represented “a significant failure” by the Air Force to ensure sensitive military components, Gates said.

Gates said the report concluded that erosion in the branch’s command and oversight standards helped lead to the incidents, and that they could have been prevented if the oversight programs had functioned correctly.

He said he asked for the resignations after consulting President Bush.

Sen. Carl Levin, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Armed Service committee, welcomed Gates’ decision.

“Secretary Gates’ focus on accountability is essential and had been absent from the office of the Secretary of Defense for too long,” Levin said. “The safety and security of America’s nuclear weapons must receive the highest priority, just as it must in other countries.”

Rep. Edward J. Markey, a Massachusetts Democrat and a senior member of the House Homeland Security Committee, also welcomed the resignations.

Markey said he’s long been concerned about what he called a series of dangerous Air Force missteps in handling nuclear weapons.

“The magnitude and frequency of these errors indicate a deep-seated problem within Air Force culture, practice and training,” Markey said. “The entire Department of Defense should immediately recommit itself to ensuring the safety and security of our nuclear stockpile before one of these mistakes has lethal consequences.”

A senior military source said the August nuclear weapons incident was the straw that broke the camel’s back but that other leadership issues also factored into Moseley’s and Wynne’s resignations.

A previous investigation into the B-52 flight uncovered a “lackadaisical” attention to detail in day-to-day operations at the air bases involved, an Air Force official said in October.

Maj. Gen. Dick Newton, assistant deputy chief of staff for operations, said the investigation found “a failure to follow procedures” by “a limited number of airmen” at the two bases. Newton defended the procedures themselves.

Low on power, but IAF okay with it

The Indian Air Force has decided to induct Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) despite its inability to carry the weapons payload essential to meet the country’s wartime requirements.

LCA squadrons will fly with American GE-404 engines that do not generate enough thrust power for the aircraft to be fully weaponised. Confirming this, sources in the Ministry of Defence said: “The engine generates a thrust power of around 80-85 kilo Newton in comparison to the air force’s requirement of 95-100 kilo Newton. This will compromise the LCA’s weaponisation.”

The IAF has already placed an order for 20 LCAs, christened Tejas, to be followed by another squadron of 20.

More powerful engines such as General Electric’s 414 or Eurojet EJ 200 meet the IAF’s needs. But defence sources said, “There is no way heavier engines can be fitted on the LCA without drastic design changes, which could take up to four years. We may have to co-develop a new engine with a foreign manufacturer.”

The indigenous Kaveri engine, which was to power the LCA, has been under development for more than two decades at the Bangalore-based Gas Turbine and Research Establishment. The project is unlikely to be completed before 2012. Sanctioned in 1989 at a cost of Rs 382.81 crore, Kaveri’s development cost has spiralled to a whopping Rs 2,839 crore.

The LCA project was sanctioned a quarter of a century ago as a replacement for the IAF’s ageing MiG fighters. Initial operational clearance (IOC) for the LCA has been delayed by two years and is now expected only in 2010, the year scheduled tentatively for the aircraft’s induction.

Air force pilots will be restrained from maximising mission performance of the LCA due to angle of attack (AOA) limitations. The sources added, “The LCA has achieved an AOA of 17 degrees though the IAF would have preferred 21 degrees.”

The original LCA project cost was estimated to be Rs 560 crore. However, the government has already sanctioned Rs 5,490 crore for the development of technology demonstrators, prototype vehicles and eight pre-production aircraft. By the time the aircraft reaches the IOC stage, the cost would have doubled.